In military doctrine, cyberspace is defined as the fifth domain of warfare, alongside the other four: land, sea, air, and space.
Because it lacks a direct physical presence and is not yet fully integrated into how we perceive our environment, it may also be the domain in which we struggle the most to understand its relationship to warfare and its implications, particularly during armed conflict. All the more reason for us to try to understand it.
Every day, we digitalize a little bit more. When was the last time you held a CD, paid for something without a credit card, or even read the news somewhere other than on your phone?
There is an invisible construct surrounding us, so imperceptibly integrated into our lives that we have barely noticed its presence. Hence the ingenuity of its application, but also the threat it poses to our populations.
Should any modern nation engage in armed conflict, it may come as no surprise that the first wave of attacks is digital rather than kinetic. Caruso (1) provides a particularly interesting explanation of when cyber actors become direct participants in hostilities (DPH), potentially exposing themselves to being considered legitimate military targets without necessarily understanding how they got there.
The threshold of harm (2), causal links (3), and belligerent nexus (4) may not be as readily apparent when actions are carried out behind a screen. The fact that most of us cannot intuitively comprehend the destructive capabilities of cyberattacks only reinforces these gaps, distancing them from the more easily understood consequences of kinetic warfare.
While acts of terrorism and disruptions caused by cyberoperations, whether motivated by economic gain or ideology, may be relatively straightforward to recognize based on their consequences and the number of people affected, the legal implications are considerably more complicated.
It may come as a surprise, or at least it did to me, that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had already proposed clearer rules for civilian hackers involved in armed conflicts back in October 2023 (5).
This, of course, leaves us with a rather significant problem, as capability can easily be confused with motive and intention during an actual armed conflict. Consider, for instance, an ordinary internet café being targeted as military infrastructure because of a misattributed cyberattack, or simply because the accusation provides a convenient excuse to provoke civil unrest.
It’s not as though international law is always upheld during openly hostile armed conflicts. We now have to contend with potential actors who are entirely willing to disregard established rules of warfare, carrying out attacks that are not only asymmetric in nature (with costs disproportionately low compared to the damage inflicted), but also difficult, if not impossible, to attribute correctly. Such attacks may consequently be interpreted as legitimate acts of war, regardless of who was actually responsible.
The aforementioned expansion of digital infrastructure also introduces increasingly unpredictable attack surfaces that are difficult to secure, precisely because the broader public cannot readily perceive how their Internet of Things (IoT) devices are interconnected. This makes them attractive targets for malicious actors.
As with everything, literacy is an important factor. After all, computers and the internet have only been widely accessible to the public for approximately my lifetime. Our current digital infrastructure, and the interactions between the physical and digital worlds, are younger still. By comparison, our collective cybersecurity awareness may be at a stage similar to general literacy at the beginning of the last century.
As more digital natives enter the workforce and complete higher education, we may see not only a better understanding of our now parallel realities (physical and digital), but also a greater appreciation of how to properly protect our homes.
The coming years may be complicated for the cybersecurity sector, but truth be told, many of our vulnerabilities are not the result of particularly advanced attack techniques. Rather, they stem from embarrassingly low levels of awareness among our populations.
Here’s hoping we realize this in time, before having to pay the price for the lesson.
Notes:
- I have thoroughly enjoyed his book: Inside Cyber Warfare
- The act must negatively affect the enemy’s military operations or capabilities. (Caruso p.58)
- There needs to be a direct causal relationship between the act and the harm involved in the first condition. Attacks that do not meet this criterion are labeled “indirect participation” and will not open the door to targeting the individual. (Caruso, idem.)
- The cyber operation needs to be about the conflict, as opposed to a random cyber attack that takes place during a conflict but is unrelated (i.e., ransomware, financial credentials theft, espionage). (Caruso, idem.)
- 8 rules for “civilian hackers” during war, and 4 obligations for states to restrain them – Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog
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